

EN LA BOCA DEL LOBO - IN THE MOUTH OF THE WOLF: THE US MILITARY AND THE DRUG WAR IN PERU

**A MONOGRAPH
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Abstract

En la Boca del Lobo - *In the Mouth of the Wolf: The US Military and the Drug War in Peru* by Major Manuel A. Rodriguez VII, 43 pages.

This monograph examines the US military involvement in the "drug war" since 1989, as well as some of the issues that the military officer may have to deal with while conducting counterdrug operations in Peru. In 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued guidance to the armed services identifying drug trafficking as a national security problem. This guidance also established that the Department of Defense (DOD) would play a key role in combating this problem. Since that time, the US military has become increasingly involved with the war on drugs.

Located on the western coast of South America, the country of Peru is extremely poor; one of the few exports it does have of any monetary consequence is coca. Peru not only produces more coca leaves than any other country it is also the major refiner of coca paste into cocaine base. Although Colombians control a sizable portion of the cocaine processing, there are indications that the Peruvians are developing their own cocaine refining operations.

Cocaine is a stimulant, categorized as "one of the most threatening drugs to US society." Although coca has been in use since antiquity in Peru it is only since the 1970's that it became an exported crop. This transformation of coca as a cash crop along with the increased demand for cocaine in the United States led to higher production of cocaine.

The connection between Peruvian insurgent groups such as the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) and narcotraffickers is a difficult one to prove conclusively. Both parties operate illegally and the details of their internal operations are not readily available. The *Sendero Luminoso* levy a tax on coca incomes to gain capital, but this is not excessive. The coca producing area is appealing not only to the *Sendero Luminoso*, but also to the "*Tupac Amaru*" Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Both groups fight the Peruvian Armed Forces as well as each other.

To combat the rise in illegal drug use in the United States, the federal government has developed a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). The NDCS serves as an official statement by the Administration on the present status of the drug war as well as strategies for further operations.

Under the NDCS programs and missions are assigned to the various federal agencies. Missions assigned to the DOD fall under the category of Detection and Monitoring (D&M). Part of this is interdiction of smuggling. This interdiction takes place in the air, on the sea and on the land. US interdiction efforts in Peru are primarily aerial

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interdiction and these have yielded positive results. Command and Control (C2) for the drug war is a complex affair requiring coordination at all levels to ensure success.

While there have been successes in the drug war in Peru, the reality of this is that illegal drugs will not be eradicated. What is necessary to understand is that the nature of the drug business makes the traffickers highly adaptive and the law enforcement efforts must adapt to meet these challenges.

Introduction: What is to be done?

The result, I believe, is a truly national plan to combat illegal drugs, one that will bring us success in this decade.¹

I am pleased to be able to report that there are indications that we are embarked on the right path: although much remains to be done and serious problems still confront us, numerous indicators show that we are beginning to see significant declines in drug use throughout the Nation.²

The war on drugs is vital to our country's economy, international competitiveness, and security.³

This monograph examines the US military involvement in the "drug war" ⁴ since 1989, as well as some of the issues that the military officer may have to deal with while conducting counterdrug operations in Peru. To understand the present situation completely this monograph looks at Peruvian geography, society, economy and history. The very term "drug war" evokes the vision of massed armies meeting in decisive battle.

Part of the mission to stop the flow of drugs into the United States belongs to the military. In 1989, the Secretary of Defense issued guidance to the armed services that identified drug trafficking as a national security problem. This guidance also established that the Department of Defense (DOD) would play a key role in combating this problem.⁵ Since that time, the US military has become increasingly involved with the war on drugs. It is for this

reason that the military planner of today must become aware of this issue. More than the amount of money expended for training, the counterdrug war is a genuine security issue for the US. The armed services bring to the table unique capabilities that support the civilian lead agencies in this endeavor. Military planners will become more and more involved with this effort than has previously been the case. The drug war is different from fighting in the Fulda Gap, Desert Storm, or almost any other scenario currently contemplated at the military service schools. The centers of gravity are different, as are the measures of success. The US military will likely remain a key player in the counterdrug effort for many years to come.

The drug problem is a complex affair. It represents a regional problem for the countries in South America where coca is grown. The impact of drugs on the economies of these nations is significant. On the one hand, illegal drugs represent a significant flow of dollars into their countries, on the other, they stand to lose US loans and aid if their prosecution of the drug industry is not aggressive enough. Some maintain that illegal drugs are the only thing that keeps these underdeveloped countries afloat.⁶

Each of the agencies involved in this effort has its own charter to conduct operations within certain parameters allowed by law. To adequately cover all the "bases" and

allow no gaps requires the cooperation of all of the agencies involved. At last count, twenty-seven federal agencies⁷ supported the war on drugs. This does not include the DOD or any of the state or local agencies.⁸ Each of the different agencies involved in the drug war has its own special expertise.

The country of Peru is extremely poor; one of the few exports it does have of any monetary consequence is coca. The Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) produces much of the world's coca. Peru is also the major refiner of coca paste into cocaine base. Refined coca paste is shipped to Colombia for the final refinement prior to shipment abroad. Although Colombians control a sizable portion of the cocaine processing, there are indications that the Peruvians are developing their own cocaine refining operations.⁹ Narcotraffickers divert the essential chemicals required by clandestine laboratories from legitimate chemical shipments entering Peru's seaports as well as those coming overland from Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador.

A simple answer would be to stop the growing of this poison. Reality, however, is never simple. The peasants engaged in the cultivation of coca live a precarious hand-to-mouth existence. Terrorized by the police and army on one hand, and the insurgents and drug traffickers on the other, these people do not grow coca to get rich. . . they

grow it to survive at the barest level. The offers of profits from legitimate crops are viewed with skepticism at best. Indeed, the Indians of the UHV have little reason to trust the "outsiders" from Lima and their plans. The peasants of the UHV are truly like David, in the lion's den, or as they themselves would say, "*En la Boca del Lobo.*"¹⁰

Many programs do not work because the peasants do not trust the representatives from Lima, or from anywhere for that matter. These Indians have a legacy of poverty, mistreatment and neglect. The Government of Peru has a chaotic and often repressive background, particularly when dealing with the Indians in the highlands. Many Peruvians of Spanish descent view the Indians with contempt and regard any work to improve their lot in life as wasted effort.

While many maintain that the US drug problem is one answered through demand reduction alone, this argument alone does not hold water. The deleterious effects of the cocaine industry on the South American region are seen in the increased incidence of crime, economic distortion, loss of productivity, corruption, increased health costs and a growing addiction problem.¹¹ These combine to make drugs a regional problem for South, as well as North America.

The drug industry presents a threat to the countries of South America. The economic distortion caused by millions of drug dollars circulating in countries with already

fragile economies is devastating. The turf wars the narcotraffickers wage to gain more coca, and the counterdrug efforts of the police and military forces catch the peasants in between forces they cannot hope to counter. All of this combines to make the hold that governments exert over their countries all the more tenuous. Of the countries in South America three represent significant portions of the drug industry. These are Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. Colombia, it is claimed is a "fully functioning narco-democracy",¹² Bolivia is a relative newcomer in the drug business, and Peru produces more coca than any other nation. Because of her location Peru is becoming a major transit point for drugs into the United States.

Peru

Of the numerous nations which occupied the great American continent at the time of its discovery by Europeans, the two most advanced in power and refinement were undoubtedly those of Mexico and Peru . . . if their [the Peruvians] history shall be found to present less strange anomalies and striking contrasts than that of the Aztecs, it may interest us quite as much by the pleasing picture it offers of a well-regulated government and sober habits of industry under the patriarchal sways of the Incas.¹³

Nature has smiled on the country of Peru. Located on the Western coast of South America Peru has been the meeting point for cultures over the centuries. Civilizations have come and gone leaving marks on Peru that are wondered about even today. The mysterious Nasca Lines,¹⁴ the Mochica¹⁵

cities and temples, and the abandoned Inca city of Machu Picchu resting in the clouds among the peaks of the Andes, all find their homes in Peru.¹⁶ These ancient peoples had access to the rich fish beds of the Humboldt Current that provided them with food and they could rely upon the sea to provide the food that the land could not.¹⁷ Nature has also seen fit to grace Peru with such a variety of mineral deposits that it almost defies comprehension.¹⁸

The Land

With a modern land area of 1.28 million square kilometers, Peru is a country of stark contrasts.¹⁹ Peru boasts partial control of the world's highest navigable lake, *Lago Titicaca*.²⁰ The variety of climates in the country is quite diverse (28 different climate types). Peru has 84 of the 103 known ecosystems. All of these factors combine to place Peru in the top five countries with the greatest biological diversity in the world. Peru is a country divided into three basic portions. The Andean cordillera runs down the country like a spine separating a tropical coastal shelf and arid deserts, from deep Amazonian jungles. This compartmentalization of the country also serves to divide the country along social lines. The coastal plain is home to a majority of the Peruvians of

Spanish descent. This area also has most of the wealth and such industry that is extant in Peru. The Indians of the highlands have little in terms of material wealth and the economy there is at the cottage industry level. The Amazon Basin still represents a largely unsettled and frontier area.

The People

The demographics of the country do not mirror the diversity of the land. Indians account for the largest portion of the ethnic breakdown at 45%, while mestizos²¹ and whites are at 37% and 15% respectively. Other ethnic groups, such as Chinese and Japanese (the latter providing the country with its most recent president), make up about 3% of the populace.²² Peru is relatively monolithic in terms of religious groups. Traditionally, the Peruvians are Roman Catholics; however in recent years other religions such as the Pentecostals, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints have made gains, particularly in the highlands.

The Economy

Peru's economy has become more market oriented, with a major privatization of the mining and telecommunications industries. During the 1980s, the economy suffered from

extreme inflation and an increasing internal debt. President Alberto Fujimori instituted a modest improvement of the economy by his austerity program that has since been named "Fuji Shock." By working with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and foreign investments, Peru's economy has made some modest gains since the early 1990s. Peru's industry centers around mining and fishing, although there are other sectors of the market.²³ Agriculturally, Peru does not produce enough grains to feed herself.²⁴ This is because much of the cultivation is done manually on steep terraced slopes. Holdovers from the Inca times, these terraces produce potatoes and other sustenance items, but not the sort of foods required for a growing population. To establish and maintain terraced land is backbreaking labor intensive work.²⁵

To compound the problems associated with crop production, there also exists a problem with actually transporting the crops to the market place. A poor transportation infrastructure frustrates efforts to make the country less sufficient on exports. It is not an easy affair to transport the few crops produced on terraced land to the cities.²⁶ Another factor that indirectly makes growing coca more appealing to the small farmer, the narcotraffickers are willing to purchase their crops

directly at the farm eliminating the concerns of transportation.

The Impact

Peru is a divided land geographically, socially, and economically. These physical divisions also serve to delineate the racial and ethnic divisions in the country. The coastal region is populated mostly by the descendants of the Spaniards. The more developed portions of the country are generally located along the coast centered on Lima, the capital. The Andean region of the country plays host to the Quechua Indian population of Peru. Here are the descendants of the Incas. With a deep seated distrust of outsiders, especially those who may be of Spanish descent they are a closed society. There are numbers of these people who acculturate into the Spanish society. These *Mestizos* are the adventurers of Peruvian society, working their way up the rigid social ladder by dint of their own ingenuity.

On the eastern side of the Andes Mountains, the Amazon River Basin is the home of another group of Indians. These people are broken down into many different tribes with different dialects. These groups form another part of the fabric of Peruvian society. Although Peru has not deforested their rain forest to the same extent as the Brazilians, there have been incursions into the "Green Hell"

of the Amazon to form new frontiers. The Amazonian Indians have also been dispossessed and find themselves in a gradually shrinking land with lesser means. Economically, the majority of the business, foreign interest and real (legitimate) wealth of the nation, is found in the coastal plain. Some attempts have been made to move businesses in to the highlands and the Amazon, but the poor infrastructure of the country make these impracticable.

The Conquistadors

... to serve God and His Majesty, to give light to those who are in darkness, and to grow rich, as all men desire to do.²⁷

While nature may have been benevolent to Peru, history has not been. The Spaniards that colonized Peru had a legacy of strife. In their past lay the Inquisition, the Reconquista²⁸ and numerous European wars.²⁹ These experiences stamped a fierce sense of the justness of their cause firmly on the souls of the men who crossed the seas in search of "*El Dorado*."³⁰

Following the discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus, the Spanish gradually made their way there seeking riches. Finding none at the start, the colonists settled onto the islands of the Caribbean establishing plantations and produced agricultural products for export to Spain.

Labor proved a problem for these plantation owners and they soon enslaved whatever native populations happened to be on their islands. A royal decree formalized the enslavement of the native populace by levying a tribute tax on the Indians paid through indentured servitude for three generations. The family was free only after the labor of the father, the son and the grandson.

Left to themselves, the Spanish colonies in the Americas would probably have developed on their own, paying lip service to the Spanish crown. The conquest of Mexico and the wealth that it brought to Spain caused the King of Spain to scrutinize these colonies more closely. Soon royal appointees began appearing, bringing with them clerics, and other bureaucrats. Increased royal presence gradually pushed the original settlers into newer lands. This coupled with recurring rumors of golden civilizations to the south proved irresistible to men who once made their living by the sword. If there were golden cities out there, the Spaniards would surely prevail, whatever hardships lay to the west they could overcome them.

It was perhaps the bad luck of the Aztecs and Incas that their civilizations offered the Spaniards precisely what they sought. They had gold, land, agricultural products and more importantly, the means to exploit these windfalls: Large Indian populations who could work the plantations or

the mines. That the Indians could field armies many times larger than those of the Spanish concerned them not one iota, the decades of European warfare had made them confident in their abilities.³¹

For some time Francisco Pizarro, the illegitimate son of a noble, had searched for riches in the New World. Pizzaro's travels to seek wealth began in 1525. After several unsuccessful trips to South America his expedition landed on the north coast of Peru in 1532.³² The Spaniards made their way to the highlands of Peru pretending friendship towards the Indians there. Through deceit they lured the Inca, Atahualpa³³ to a meeting in the town of Cajamarca and treacherously captured him, killing some 1000 of his retinue in the process. Atahualpa tried to buy his freedom promising to fill a room with gold and an adjoining room with silver.³⁴ The Spaniards readily agreed and soon the treasure began accumulating.³⁵ As the wealth trickled in, disturbing rumors circulated about rescue attempts and Indian uprisings. Concerned for his safety, Pizarro had a series of charges drawn up against Atahualpa and placed him on trial.³⁶ The trial was little better than a kangaroo court and Atahualpa was found guilty and sentenced to death and executed. The Spanish conquistadors now moved to expand their control over the remainder of the country, although it took about forty more years to finish subduing the Indians.

The last ruling Inca, Tupac Amaru was killed, and by 1572 the country was firmly in the hands of the Spaniards.³⁷

The Results of History

The behavior of the Spanish during the colonial period set the stage for Spanish-Indian relations that remains in existence today. The results of the Spanish colonization on Peru are that the Indians do not trust the whites, or mestizos³⁸ that traditionally occupy higher positions in society. The Indian population of the highlands resist any form of influence from the outside. Foreign crop experts, oil surveyors, and the various aid workers are viewed with skepticism and distrust. For their part, the mestizos look upon the Indians as "the animal next to man." The white, and mestizo, also feel that the Indian is sly, lazy and a brute.³⁹ While recruits for the Peruvian Army come from all over the country, the troops sent to the highlands are primarily from the coastal areas and have nothing in common with the Indians. The gulf between them is too wide.

Cocaine: The White Goddess

Tobacco, too, was among the products of this elevated region. Yet the Peruvians differed from every other Indian nation to whom it was known, by using it only for medicinal purposes, in the form of snuff. They have found a substitute for its narcotic qualities in the coca (*Erythoxylum Peruvianum*), or *cuca*, as it is called by the natives. This shrub which grows to the height of the man. The leaves when gathered are dried in the sun, and, being mixed with a little lime, form a preparation for chewing, much like the betel-leaf

of the East. With a small supply of *coca* in his pouch, and a handful of roasted maize, the Peruvian Indian of our time performs his wearisome journeys, day after day, without fatigue, or, at least without complaint.⁴⁰

Cocaine is a stimulant, categorized as "one of the most threatening drugs to US society."⁴¹ It is the end result of refinement and processing of the leaves of the coca tree or shrub, an evergreen. These leaves contain cocaine and other alkaloids. Coca leaves have long been used in Peru. During Peruvian antiquity, Inca nobles chewed coca to produce visions and achieve an elevated state of conscious. During their conquest of Peru, the Spaniards found that chewing coca seemed to reduce fatigue, and deaden hunger pangs. Rumor even had it that coca could cure the altitude sickness from which the Spaniards suffered. A peasant could work the fields all day with a little coca, and it was easy to grow. Soon the *Patrones*, or landowners, were providing coca to their peasants along with their meals on a daily or weekly basis. Alternatively, the landowners allotted a small allowance to the peasants for the purchase of coca.⁴²

This apparent dependence on coca may be form of passive resistance using cultural means. During the colonial period in Peru, the Indians reinforced the idea that they needed coca leaves to work in the fields. Without their "coca break" work was not possible. Chewing coca has the unintended consequence of further dividing the Indians from

the Peruvians of Spanish descent. Chewing coca is regarded as an Indian habit and separates them from the mainstream. Whatever it's purpose in society, coca is an important part of the Indian's lives.⁴³

Coca is such a part of life in the Peruvian highlands that no man will leave his house without his bag of coca. Peasants always chew coca before embarking on any important matter, and no Indian would even think of conducting any agricultural work without chewing the leaf. Often the head of the household takes some coca before retiring for the night in the belief that the plant will help him divine the future. Coca also serves as a form of money in the highlands; the bundles passing through many hands in exchange for goods.⁴⁴

Cocaine, Other Uses

Cocaine had been in use long before it gained popularity as a recreational drug in the 1970s and 80's in the United States. Cocaine was first isolated in 1859, from coca leaves brought from Peru by Austrian explorer Karl Von Scherzerin. Von Scherzerin saw cocaine as an anesthetic, but physicians of the time showed little interest.⁴⁵ It was not until 1884 when an ophthalmologist named Carl Killer introduced cocaine as a local anesthetic for eye surgery.⁴⁶

Gradually, the medical community began to see the possibilities for the drug.

Humble Beginnings

How did the cocaine industry move from a legitimate cash crop to a multimillion dollar illegal industry? People searching for someone to blame can find a fair amount in the person of Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde-Terry,⁴⁷ whose two presidencies were notable for inefficiency and corruption. During his first Administration (1963-1968), Belaunde-Terry, determined to improve the state of the nation, declared the Amazon Basin on the eastern side of the Andes Mountains, the country's "new frontier." To exploit this area, roads were built to facilitate access to the rain forest. Belaunde-Terry envisioned this new frontier as an area of agricultural production; the country's bread basket, so to speak. Peru could then be more self sufficient and free herself from foreign imports. To attract settlers to this area, parcels of land were doled out. Many of the immigrants that flocked to the reclaimed land were from the poor that had settled in the shanty towns around Lima and the other big cities.

All of this scheming was for naught; Peru lacked the resources and the means to fulfill the vision. The

agricultural production never reached the levels expected by Belaunde-Terry's government in Lima. One of the few crops that did seem to flourish in this area was the coca plant. This hardy plant is easy to tend and produces several crops per year.

The success of coca as a cash crop along with the increased demand for cocaine in the United States led to higher production of cocaine. Soon coca became the dominant crop in the region.⁴⁸ Narcotraffickers are willing to pay for coca leaves on the spot and will pick it up directly from the farm, this makes the crop more appealing to the small farmer. The farmer does not have to transport his crop on poor roads to an uncertain market.

Peru now cultivates coca on some 115,300 hectares of land, primarily in the Upper Huallaga Valley.⁴⁹ Growing coca provides income for about 300,000 peasants in the valley.⁵⁰ While Peru produces most of the coca leaves, and the paste rendered from these leaves, a majority of the refinement takes place in Colombia. Given that the total area under cultivation in South America for the purpose of growing coca is about 214,800 hectares, a reasonable production estimate for the refined product is about 780 metric tons. Of this, an estimate of the US demand is 300 metric tons, or 38% of the total supply. This amount is far and away a larger share than anywhere else in the world.⁵¹

The Peruvian Government held the monopoly for the coca trade for some time. Government stores purchased all coca leaves harvested at fixed prices. The Government in turn distributed the coca throughout the highlands at relatively stable, low prices. This was until the demand for cocaine from the United States rose during the 1970's. Town stores were bought out by "foreigners" according to the Indians in highland villages. These "foreigners" turned out to be Colombians who crossed the border and emptied Peruvian stores of coca leaf stocks well over the Government rate. The Colombians refined these leaves and began to form groups of "businessmen" or cartels. More than the increase in demand for coca was the development, or rather streamlining, of the means of transport. Coca leaves are grown mostly in Peru and refined into a paste. This mixture is transported to laboratories in Colombia for the final refinement into cocaine. In the early 1980's, a group of narcotraffickers opted to pool their shipments to the US to reduce their losses and cut the transportation costs. Cocaine had entered the realm of big business. The members of the cartel are not true business partners in the formal sense, they merely have a common interest in profits.

Narco-guerrillas

The existence of a Maoist based insurgency in South America may seem incongruous. Latin American insurgencies typically look towards Cuba for ideological direction. In the case of the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*), it follows an understandable path. The roots of the *Sendero Luminoso* stretch back to the highland town of Ayacucho. In 1962, a professor of philosophy named Abimael Guzman Reynoso began the Communist Party of the Peru-Red Flag (*Partido Comunista del Peru-Bandera Roja*, PCP-BR). Seeing similarities between pre-communist China and Peru, Guzman used the concept of a peasant based revolution and his version of Chinese Marxism blended with the ideas of Mariategui (a Peruvian intellectual Marxist and founder of the PCP in 1928) as an ideological foundation for his movement.

The PCP-BR continued for some time splitting and fragmenting until by 1970 Guzman and his followers renamed themselves the Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Mariategui, shortened to *Sendero Luminoso*. During the 1970's, the *Sendero Luminoso* evolved from a discussion group to active participation in the nearby peasant communities. Their Maoist doctrine emphasizes the importance of the rural populace over the city dwellers. While the *Sendero's* first acts of terrorism took place in the city of Lima they were,

and still are, a movement that has its home in the highlands.⁵²

Likely targets of the *Sendero Luminoso's* terror campaign include local government officials and representatives of the central government who work in the countryside. Because of its centralized organization, brutal methods and efficiency, the *Sendero* soon became a major security threat for the Peruvian military.

The connection between the *Sendero Luminoso* and narcotraffickers has been studied for some time. In 1982, President Belaunde-Terry (during his second term in office) maintained that there was an alliance of sorts between the *Sendero* and narcotraffickers. In 1984, the chief of the Campa tribe reported to a local paper that narcotraffickers had built coca production facilities on the banks of the Ene River. Colombians ran these facilities, but they received support from 'terrorists.'⁵³ Later in 1984, the Peruvian authorities coined the term "narcoterrorists" to describe this marriage of convenience.

The connection between the *Sendero Luminoso* and narcotraffickers is a difficult one to prove conclusively. Both parties operate illegally and the details of their internal operations are not readily available. What is clear is that during the early 1980's the *Sendero* moved into the Huallaga valley as part of their efforts to expand their

influence in the countryside. There they found the peasants growing coca for sale to Colombians. The Colombians fixed the prices for leaf coca and were paying relatively low prices for it in comparison to the profits they made from the end product. Following their doctrine, the *Sendero* organized the peasants to extend their influence among the peasantry at the grassroots level, as well as showing that the Peruvian Government was incapable of operating in the valley. The *Sendero* levy a tax on coca incomes to gain capital, but this is not excessive.

There have been a variety of theories as to the nature of the link between the traffickers and the *Sendero*. Some theories hold that the *Sendero* tax the coca growing peasants to purchase weapons. This is not necessarily true, when one examines the weapons carried by the *Sendero*. These weapons are usually captured from Peruvian security forces or older weapons. The *Sendero Luminoso* have moved into the UHV as a result of their Maoist doctrine. They seek to establish a sort of shadow government that functions in place of the central government in Lima. The *Senderistas* organize the peasants to ensure that they have some measure of prosperity, tax them modestly and govern them. In short, the *Sendero Luminoso* provides a stable environment.

The *Sendero* are not concerned with the effects of cocaine on the "decadent" people of the US, and thus they

can rationalize their tacit support for the drug industry. While the *Sendero Luminoso* does not concern themselves with the production of coca for export, they do strictly oppose the criminal activity commonly connected with drugs. Drug addicts, prostitutes, and other petty criminals receive harsh punishments at the hands of the *Sendero's* cadres.⁵⁴

The coca producing area is appealing not only to the *Sendero Luminoso*, but also to the "*Tupac Amaru*"⁵⁵ Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru-MRTA*). The MRTA is another insurgent group that is vying for control of Peru. The MRTA and the *Sendero* routinely clash over the control of regions of Peru. Usually the MRTA comes out on the losing end.

The roots of the MRTA extend back to 1976 with the founding of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (*Partido Revolucionaria Socialista-PSR*). The PSR fragmented into splinter groups of radicals and moderates achieving little or no unity among them. The vision of the organization is based on a romantic version of Peruvian nationalism. The Peruvian people, according to the MRTA, are heirs to an ancient and glorious past that reaches back to the time of the Incas and forward through the political and social turmoil of Peruvian history. The MRTA consider themselves a movement of the people. They claim to represent a cross

section of Peruvian society. Casting a wide ideological net for potential recruits a party tract states:

Alongside the laborers, there is a place for the poor and the communal peasant, the semi-proletariat, casual and itinerant workers, office employees, revolutionary women intellectuals, artists of the people, committed Christian, patriotic policemen, soldiers, and officers.⁵⁶

The ideological foundation of the *Sendero Luminoso* is the Maoist thought, but the MRTA look towards the Cuban Revolution of the 1959 for guidance. This influences their approach to the problems of fomenting revolution. While the *Sendero* agitate and conduct propaganda in the countryside, the MRTA are more active in the city⁵⁷ and the MRTA have become known for a series of high profile operations.⁵⁸ MRTA attacks fall into two categories: symbolic and sustaining. Symbolic attacks are likely to be conducted against foreign interests such as Kodak, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Diner's Club, Citibank and the like.⁵⁹ The second form of attack employed by the MRTA is the sustaining attack. These attacks provide the means for continuing the struggle against the Government and the *Sendero*.

In 1989, the MRTA began to move into the countryside in an attempt to secure a foothold in the rural areas of the country. This led to conflict not only with the *Sendero Luminoso* that had worked to establish firm footholds in the rural areas of Peru, but with the Indians as well. One

publicized instance occurred in 1989 when the MRTA moved into the Pasco department. In an attempt to gain influence over the Ashininka Indians, the MRTA kidnapped their tribal leader, Alejandro Calderon. This action backfired on the MRTA as the Ashininka attacked them in their bases and pursued them through the jungle with poisoned arrows and darts. Apparently the Ashininka also attacked the *Sendero Luminoso* and local narcotraffickers as well. For their part, the *Sendero* have gone after the MRTA as viciously as they have against the Government and the army. The MRTA has effectively been displaced from the countryside.⁶⁰

"Drug Wars"

For the first time in our history, the crime problem in the United States is being controlled and orchestrated by well-financed and well-equipped organizations which conduct business from abroad. Never before have we faced an enemy so formidable and so well-entrenched.⁶¹

To combat the rise in illegal drug use in the United States, the federal government has developed a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). The NDCS is the guiding document for narcotics control policy at the national level and is produced by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). This document is the Administration's statement on the status of current programs, success in the various areas

of interest around the world, the strategic goals of the US, as well as the resources that will be committed in the upcoming fiscal year. Joint Pub 3-7.04 describes the NDCS as "a comprehensive program of CD [counterdrug] actions employing a multinational and multiagency approach to the problem of illegal drugs." ⁶² The first National Drug Control Strategy was disseminated by the ONDCP in 1989 and represented a unified approach to the drug problem. It has been an annual report since then.

Both the Bush and Clinton administrations claim some measure of success in their counterdrug operations. Recognizing that the drug threat is one that quickly adapts to a changing environment. The 1992 Bush NDCS⁶³ was a programs oriented approach to the drug problem. The national priorities are outlined by explaining the programs that in place to address that particular aspect of the drug problem. The Clinton NDCS⁶⁴ is a goal oriented approach to the drug issue explaining what the goals of that particular strategy. The number one priority of the Clinton drug control strategy is to prevent young users from getting started. The most recent NDCS is the 1996 Clinton administration NDCS that maintains there is "cause for guarded optimism."⁶⁵ This is partially because of the detection and monitoring efforts of cocaine shipments as they cross the Caribbean Sea. The NDCS also maintains that

there has been success in the US aerial interdiction over the Andean Ridge which has caused the narcotraffickers to reroute their shipments.⁶⁶ Key to both Administrations' approach to the drug problem is the understanding that the flow of drugs into the US is part of the overall effort. As a result, the DOD is a major part of the US counterdrug effort.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major responsibilities to the DOD. The DOD would act as the single lead agency for detection and monitoring (D&M) aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US. The DOD was further tasked to provide an effective communications network the command, control, communications, and dedicate technical intelligence assets to detecting and monitoring (D&M) the movement of illegal drugs into the US. Finally, the state governors would receive approval and funding for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction.

The DOD role of D&M is a complicated part of the overall drug interdiction process. The goal of D&M is to provide early notification to, and, as necessary, prolonged tracking of, aerial and surface targets for appropriate law enforcement agencies (LEAs). This helps them conduct interceptions, searches, arrests, and seizures of illegal drugs. The principal counterdrug mission of the DOD is to

D&M. The objective of successful D&M is for the civilian LEAs to interdict the illegal drugs and arrest the smugglers involved. Drug interdiction can take place anywhere; in the air, at sea, or on land. The purpose of interdiction in Peru is to complement the host nation abilities. Thus, the programs enacted by the United States provide coverage in areas where the Peruvian Government or armed forces cannot, or lack the resources to do themselves.

Air Interdiction

Using air transportation is the cheapest and most effective means of transporting drugs. The Peru-Colombia "air bridge" has been one of the more active drug routes in South America.⁶⁷ Detection and monitoring in this area focuses to a large extent on the aerial interdiction of this route. The objective of air interdiction is to detect and track smuggling aircraft and pass this information to the Peruvian authorities. Detection involves not only the airborne warning, but the cueing of Peruvian Air Force aircraft to intercept and force the smuggler plane down. This operation netted 9 drug trafficking aircraft destroyed and 2 forced down and seized in 1995.⁶⁸ The specifics of the air interdiction effort in Peru are discussed later.

Maritime Interdiction

Maritime interdiction efforts focus principally on deterring drug smuggling by monitoring seaborne smuggling routes, detecting and seizing smuggling vessels, and arresting their crews. Maritime interdiction in international waters and US territorial waters is primarily the responsibility of the US Coast Guard, although Navy vessels are also involved. In US sea ports, the Customs Service acts as the lead agency. Over the years, maritime smuggling methods have grown increasingly sophisticated to counter enforcement efforts.⁶⁹ As with air interdictions, host nations may also conduct maritime interdictions. Since air interdiction has yielded some measure of success, coca is now being transported using the coastal waters and rivers in the Amazon jungle. While interdiction on "brown water" may not necessarily be a Coast Guard mission, the US Navy does operate a small boat school in Panama. Navy Special Warfare personnel also conduct Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).

Land Interdiction

The land interdiction mission is conducted within the United States territory, by law enforcement agencies. As mentioned above, the US Customs Service has the responsibility for US sea ports and other points of entry into the United States. The US Border Patrol is responsible

for the border area between these points of entry. These operations include the establishment of checkpoints and observation posts overwatching the border. In some areas, DOD personnel may become involved in the D&M along the border, however this is beyond the scope of this work. The US Government is not involved in land interdiction in Peru at this time. This is the responsibility of the Peruvian Army, and the Peruvian anti-drug police forces described later.

Strategic C2 Structure

The National Security Council (NSC) is the primary forum for national security matters that require a Presidential decision. The functions of the NSC are to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military national security policies to improve interdepartmental cooperation.⁷⁰ Below the NSC are various interagency groups and committees. Among these are the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, as well as the less formal Coordinating Subgroups (CSG). The CSGs are interagency working groups that operate at the action officer level. Within the scope of matters relating to narcotics control, the Coordinating Subgroup for Narcotics works on broad policies relating to drugs. Much of the work

in turn is divided among several smaller working groups (See Table 1).

Within the Department of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) has been designated the DOD coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. The ASD for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4I) also is responsible for integration of technical intelligence collectors.⁷¹

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides strategic guidance to each of the CinCs for the conduct of counterdrug operations. This guidance is based on the National Military Strategy and in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This guidance allows the CinC to develop their theater plans for counterdrug operations based on their particular region.⁷²

Within the Operations Directorate (J-3), the Counter Narcotics Operations Division (CNOD) acts as the coordinating element in the Joint Staff for DOD counterdrug operations. The CNOD reviews CinC budget submissions to ensure that counterdrug operations have been identified and are in support of CJCS priorities; monitors counterdrug operations worldwide; and reviews and coordinates national and international counterdrug policy and strategy.⁷³

Operational C2 Structure

There are several organizations that can take strategic guidance and translate it into operational goals and objectives. These organizations, working in concert can make tremendous progress in the counterdrug effort. Foremost among these is the US ambassador and his country team.

While the ambassador is an appointee of the President of the United States, he receives his guidance from the Department of State through regional bureaus. The ambassador is responsible for the US counterdrug activities within his country, but not for the US military personnel or installations that are under the command of the US commander in that area.⁷⁴ The Ambassador's Country Team may be considered part of the operational structure of the counterdrug effort. The Country Team functions to facilitate interagency coordination. The composition of this team may vary, but military members of the team usually include the Defense Attaché and the chief of the Security Assistance Office. Each of the team members is chartered to maintain communications with his stateside agency. It is important to note that the Attachés report to the Defense Intelligence Agency, at the National level, while the Military Assistance and Advisory Groups working in country report to USSOUTHCOM, the Operational headquarters. Clearly

the need for close coordination is paramount to ensure a unified effort.

Table 1. CSGN Working Groups ⁷⁵		
Working Group	Chair	Function
Andean Counterdrug Implementation Working Group	Office of National Drug Control Policy and NSC,	Oversees the implementation of Department of State (DOS) plans and evaluates host nation and US interagency performance
Cartagena Working Group	DOS Inter-American Affairs Bureau of International Narcotic Matters (BINM)	Concerned with Presidential agreements in the document of Cartagena, especially economic cooperation and trade agreements.
Heroin Strategy Working Group	DOS BINM	Focuses on the threat constituted by the heroin industry.
Military Initiatives Working Group	DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support	Oversees the military support to counterdrug operations.
Transit and Secondary Source Working Group	DOS-BINM and ONDCP	Develops policy recommendations for countries involved in the transit of drugs from the Andean Ridge to the US.
Foreign Intelligence Working Group	Central Intelligence Agency	Coordinates intelligence structures for the counterdrug effort

The US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is the US command most involved with the counterdrug war. Currently based in Quarry Heights, Panama,⁷⁶ the USSOUTHCOM oversees a range of operations each year from reducing regional tensions to

stopping the flow of illicit drugs into the US. As part of its counterdrug strategy, USSOUTHCOM supports US ambassadors, law enforcement agencies and host nations to counter the flow of illegal drugs, and the effects that they have on nations in the region. As of June 1997, USSOUTHCOM will assume responsibility for the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico (currently assigned to the United States Atlantic Command), but not the land mass of Mexico. This boundary change will allow for a more operation along a major narcotics smuggling route.

A Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) is based at Howard AFB. JIATF-South is organized under the USSOUTHCOM J-3. The JIATF helps host nations to destroy trafficking organizations, destroy drug crops, production facilities, and to track and seize drug shipments in transit to the US. The most successful JIATF-South mission has been the interdiction of air smuggling routes over the Andean Ridge, especially in Peru.⁷⁷

Tactical C2 Structure

The United States provides teams to assist training and organizing host nation forces. These teams assist not only the military forces engaged in the drug war, but the law enforcement agencies that have the responsibility to prosecute counterdrug operations. The military teams, which

will be described later, include Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs), Planning Analysis Teams (PATs) as well as Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).

The military teams above, are complemented by civilian teams from the DEA, and the US Customs Service. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) also sponsors crop substitution programs and some economic development programs.⁷⁸

US efforts in Peru

For the United States to ask us to fight a drug war is like asking a country that's fighting the Civil War and going through the Great Depression at the same time to suddenly take on Prohibition as well.⁷⁹

US counterdrug efforts in Peru have been quite successful. The program which has yielded the best results is the US-Peruvian air interdiction effort. The detection and monitoring of the Peru-Colombia "air bridge." is primarily conducted by the US Air Force. The E3C Sentry⁸⁰ airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft provide coverage over the Andean Ridge area. Radar based at Yurimaguas, Peru provides additional coverage in the area. The Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHAR)⁸¹ based in Puerto Rico, Texas, and Virginia also extend the radar coverage of the area.⁸² Within Peru, several sites have been established for the TPS43 radar. These radar sites are

located at Iquitos, Andoas, and Pacallpa and are manned by Air Force personnel from the 728th Air Control Squadron.⁸³ These sites are generally situated on or near Peruvian military bases and while the Peruvians secure the outside of these installations, the interior of the radar site is secured by the American personnel stationed there.

The United States has attempted to sponsor coca eradication efforts in Peru. One notable program was the formation of a special group to destroy coca fields under cultivation. This program was not successful because of rivalry between Peru's various governmental organizations, the presence of insurgency groups in the cultivation areas, and the fact that cultivation is still legal. Still the real problem with eradication efforts is that there is no other crop for the peasants to replace coca. Alternate crops have been tried, but the money to be made by growing coca far exceeds that of legitimate crops. This combined with the real problems of transport of crops to market over poor roads make many potential converts to legitimate crops stay with what they have.

Other forms of support that the United States provides are less direct and are smaller in scope. Support to host nation police and military forces can take the form of the Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) and the Planning Analysis Team

(PAT). These teams are important to the overall counterdrug effort in Peru.

The TAT provides intelligence support to the country team from the US embassy. The TAT provides fused intelligence to assist planning counterdrug operations. The TAT can provide intelligence support to the Drug Enforcement Administration country attaché working in the embassy. TATs do not deal in human intelligence (HUMINT), but bring the technological edge to the table. The collection focus is through the use of imagery and communications collectors. The TAT acts as a link between the country Team and the US SOUTHCOM. The function of a PAT is to provide assistance to the host nation in planning and conducting counterdrug operations.

The PAT is a planning cell that serves as a complement to the TAT. The PAT is organized based on the requirements for that particular country team, and does not necessarily include intelligence planners. A PAT can include logistics planners, air, communications or small boat specialists. The TATs and PATs assist embassy personnel conducting counterdrug operations by providing specialized personnel to provide intelligence and help plan counterdrug operations.⁸⁴ Currently there is a Joint PAT of 23 personnel, and a 1 person TAT deployed in Peru.⁸⁵

Part of the USSOUTCOM counterdrug effort is the Mobile Training Team program which deploys Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel train host nation troops. MTTs are a cost effective way to improve the skills of the Peruvian counterdrug forces and keep SOF personnel proficient as trainers. Table 2 reflects the SOF deployments in Peru as part of this program. Riverine training highlights the Special Operations Command South (SOC SOUTH) counterdrug operations in Peru.⁸⁶

Table 2. Funded SOF Counterdrug Deployments to Peru ⁸⁷		
FY 95	FY 96	FY 97
8 ⁸⁸	14	14

Key to the success of counterdrug programs are the police agencies charged with conducting counterdrug operations within the borders of Peru. These agencies function inside Peru as the primary law enforcement agencies charged with the responsibility of conducting arrests of traffickers and seizure of contraband. US law enforcement programs support the Peruvian Police's Anti-Drug Directorate (*Directoria Anti Druo* - DIANDRO). DIANDRO is charged with investigating the trafficking in illegal chemicals used for refining coca, as well as financial crimes such as money laundering. The Department of State has provided the National Police Aviation Division (*Divicion de Policia*

Avionica-DIPA) with 12 UH-1H helicopters for use in the field. These helicopters support the concept of mobile basing for the law enforcement teams which allows the counterdrug forces to operate against drug trafficking facilities from secure bases.

In comparison with other neighbors, the US counterdrug efforts in Peru have been the most successful to date.⁸⁹ The number of drug planes shot down or forced down may be an indicator of success, but these efforts at airborne interdiction may be measured by three further items: Drug traffickers are now moving their goods in the Amazon area from Peru to Colombia by boat on the maze of rivers that crisscross the Amazon Basin;⁹⁰ the price of leaf coca has fallen from \$75.00 to \$5.00 per kilogram;⁹¹ and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives also report the farmers in the region have expressed a new interest in alternative development programs.⁹²

The Changing Nature of the Beast

You could not step twice into the same rivers; for other waters are ever flowing on to you.⁹³

Peruvian Cartels?!

There have been indications that the coca industry has shifted to Peru. Lopez Parades moved from a small time celebrity to a cocaine trafficker with little difficulty and was arrested last year in connection with a 3.5 ton shipment of cocaine discovered earlier at a port in the northern part of Peru. The Peruvian police soon arrested several more "cartel" members breaking up the family. Apparently, this "Peruvian Cartel" transported the refined cocaine to the coast for shipment to Mexico and then to the US.

Other disturbing indicators of an expanded cocaine industry in Peru are the increasing involvement that the Peruvian armed forces have played in the actual smuggling of drugs themselves. In every organization, there are invariably a few "bad apples," but the problem in Peru seems to run deeper than that. In July 1996, Peruvian drug police announced that they would conduct searches of Peruvian Navy ships after finding two cocaine caches on-board Naval vessels. The Peruvian Army has also had its share of controversy in the drug business. Army officers have been accused not only of turning a blind eye to cocaine shipments, but in some cases providing troops to secure drug airstrips and widening roads for drug planes to land.⁹⁴ More sensational was the discovery of some 174 kilograms of cocaine on President Fujimori's plane bound for Moscow.⁹⁵

This criminalization of the Peruvian Armed forces is a serious problem and is being addressed, albeit in a small manner, by the programs designed to professionalize the armed and police forces. But the parallel between the Peru and Colombia in this respect cannot be overlooked. The fact of the matter is that even the ruling classes in Peru are comparatively poor and often see no problem with making money on the side to augment a poor paying job. Along with the potential criminalization of the Peruvian armed forces is the fierce interservice rivalry that has hampered several programs, among them the coca eradication program. This rivalry is also extant among the various police and military organs that are competing for US funding. These organizations do not hesitate to undermine each others efforts.

There is a problem with human rights in South America that the countries in that region are slowly working to resolve. While much of this in Peru is motivated by the ethnic and racial problems outlined earlier, the fact remains that the Indians make up a majority of the coca growers in Peru. It therefore comes as no surprise that in operations to eradicate coca the police and military forces have a great deal of contact with these Indians and that most of the human rights abuses are directed against them.

One vehicle for change is the International Military Exchange Training (IMET). The IMET for Peru is focused on enhancing civilian control over the military. Under this program selected officers travel to the US and undergo courses there. The intent is for the graduates to return to Peru more willing to support human rights and democratic policies.

Conclusion: Are we really successful?

Its propping up the governments of Colombia and Peru ...
Ask any DEA man there's nothing we can do ...
From the office of the President right down to me and you.⁹⁶

The US military has become more involved in the drug war each year since 1989. This trend is likely to continue because of the resources that the military has at its disposal. Of all the federal agencies engaged in the drug war, only the military can provide the hardware and trained operators to assist the host nations and the LEAs in seizing narcotics and arresting the traffickers. Because of this military officers will become more rather than less involved in the "drug war." There has been real concern among many that military involvement in the drug war would potentially lead to corruption in the military as seen in some countries where the defense forces are riddled with corruption. To date, there has been no evidence of this, however this sort of backlash must be guarded against. There are other

constitutional concerns about the role of the military within the borders of the US. This concern over the *Posse Comitatus* Act of the late 19th century is cause for concern. Certainly the military leadership must exercise caution to ensure that the DOD is not seen as a domestic policeman.

The changes in narcotrafficking methods mean that Peru becomes more important than has previously been the case. Peru produces more coca than any other country in South America, this will continue. Additionally, the appearance of more refinement facilities in Peru, along with the formation of the "Peruvian Cartels" indicate that the drug industry is evolving based on the threat posed by current US and Peruvian efforts. These efforts have forced the narcotraffickers to evolve. Pressure by the United States on the Government of Colombia have forced the drug trade into new territory. This evolution of the drug industry is a statement to the success of the drug war.

Measures of success in the drug war are often a matter of perspective. Government agencies cite data on the number of hectares of coca under cultivation versus the number under cultivation last year, tons of cocaine seized, or the numbers of arrests. The "body count" style system of measuring success is very much a part of the US counterdrug war. A reason for this may be found in the simple answer that these provide a concrete measure of success.

What is needed is a broad system of programs that meets the issues behind the drugs. The programs that need emphasis in the US counterdrug strategies are the ones that focus on nation building. The drug producing countries are very poor, with a rudimentary infrastructure.

Even the current Director of the ONDCP maintains that the use of illegal drugs in the US cannot be stamped out completely. According to the current Director of the ONDCP

There is no reason why we can't return America to a 1960's level, a pre-Vietnam-era level of drug use. We won't achieve a total victory on drugs. We shouldn't expect that. We can't take every heroin or crack addict and cure them of their addiction. But we should expect to reduce by enormous amounts the number of young people using drugs and the damage that this epidemic does. So if you ask me for a target, let's go back to pre-Vietnam-level eras of illegal drugs.⁹⁷

There is cause for a certain amount of optimism, however, with the causal drug use lowering each year and the seizure of an estimated 1/3 of all drug shipments prior to their distribution in the United States. The threat of illegal drugs cannot be stamped out, but it can be reduced greatly through the unified efforts of all the federal agencies. The US military has increased its involvement in the drug war since 1989 and will remain involved in this effort for the foreseeable future. What can be done is to recognize that the drug industry is one that is complex and highly adaptive. The redundancy of resources and assets

available to narcotraffickers is great. We must recognize this and adapt our countermeasures accordingly.

End Notes

- ¹ President, Letter to Congress, 1990 National Drug Control Strategy. January 1990: Cover Letter
- ² President, Letter to Congress, 1991 National Drug Control Strategy, February 1991: Cover Letter
- ³ President, Letter to Congress, 1992 National Drug Control Strategy, January 1992: Cover Letter.
- ⁴ The current Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), also called the "Drug Czar," Barry McCaffrey (Gen. Ret.) maintains that the US efforts to halt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States and to reduce the domestic demand for drugs is not a "war." Despite these protestations the US military remains committed to halting the flow of illegal drugs into the US.
- ⁵ United States Joint Staff. JOINT PUB 3-07.4 JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994: I-1.
- ⁶ Kaplan, Robert, address to School of Advanced Military Studies, 24 March 1997.
- ⁷ United States Joint Staff. JOINT PUB 3-07.4 JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994
- ⁸ Figure I-1, United States Joint Staff. JOINT PUB 3-07.4 JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994. I-6.
- ⁹ Scrutton, Alister. "Cocaine trade Threatens Peru, Experts Say." Dallas Morning News. 15 August, 1996, 10A.
- ¹⁰ This Andean idiom means essentially between a rock and a hard place.
- ¹¹ Slide 2, USSOUTHCOM Counterdrug Overview, Dec 1996.
- ¹² Cable, Larry, address to Command and General Staff Officers Course Students, March 1996.
- ¹³ Prescott, William H. History of the Conquest of Mexico & History of the Conquest of Peru. Modern Library: New York.
- ¹⁴ Nazca or Nasca, ancient indigenous culture of Southern Peru, before AD 1000. The Nazca are known for their polychrome pottery and skillful weaving and dyeing. Aerial exploration of the arid tableland surrounding their valley has revealed a network of lines interspersed with giant animal forms--probably related to Nazca astronomy and religion. (Source: Microsoft Bookshelf '95).
- ¹⁵ Mo·chi·ca (mo·chè'ke) or Mo·che (mo'chá,-chè) noun. A pre-Incan civilization that flourished on the northern coast of Peru from about 200 BC to AD 600, known especially for its pottery vessels modeled into naturalistic human and animal figures.(Source: Microsoft Bookshelf '95).
- ¹⁶ A fortress city of the ancient Incas, in a high saddle between two peaks c.50 miles northwest of Cuzco, Peru. The extraordinary pre-Colombian ruin, 5 sq. mi. (13 sq. km) of terraced stonework linked by 3,000 steps, was probably the last Inca stronghold after the Spanish Conquest; it was virtually intact when discovered by Hiram Bingham in 1911.(Source: Microsoft Bookshelf '95@).
- ¹⁷ The Humboldt Current. A cold ocean current of the South Pacific, flowing north along the western coast of South America. Also called Peru Current, after Baron Friedrich Heinrich Alexander Von Humboldt.
- ¹⁸ These resources include: copper, silver, gold, petroleum, timber, fish, iron ore, coal, phosphate, and potash. (Source: CIA World Fact Book 1995).
- ¹⁹ During the Spanish colonial period Peru was much larger, extending almost to the Atlantic Ocean. Under the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas promulgated by Pope Alexander VI divided the world along certain lines. Accordingly the Spaniards gained much of what is now South America. The Portuguese

got most of Asia, except a small corner of the eastern portion of South America. From this small area, The Portuguese colonists would expand outward almost to the base of the Andes mountains, establishing modern day Brazil.

- ²⁰ The word Titicaca is the Quechua word meaning "springing jaguar," which the lake seems to resemble.
- ²¹ Mixed Indian and European ancestry.
- ²² Source: KPMG Caipo y Asociados, Latin America, Country Profile: Peru. <http://www.latinameric.kpmg.com/peru.htm>).
- ²³ Peru's GDP is some \$73.6 billion, with a real growth rate of 8.6%. This sets the per capita income at about \$3,110. These are 1994 estimates, and represent the most current information available. (Source: KPMG Caipo y Asociados, Latin America, Country Profile: Peru. <http://www.latinameric.kpmg.com/peru.htm>).
- ²⁴ Agriculture accounts for about 12% of the GDP and 35% of the labor force (commercial crops include: coffee, cotton, sugarcane, rice wheat, potatoes, plantains, and coca). (Source: KPMG Caipo y Asociados, Latin America, Country Profile: Peru. [Http://www.latinameric.kpmg.com/peru.htm](http://www.latinameric.kpmg.com/peru.htm)).
- ²⁵ Land utilization: arable land: 3%, permanent crops: 0%, meadows and pastures: 21%, forest and woodland: 55%, other: 21%. (Source: KPMG Caipo y Asociados, Latin America, Country Profile: Peru. [Http://www.latinameric.kpmg.com/peru.htm](http://www.latinameric.kpmg.com/peru.htm)).
- ²⁶ Highways: total: 69,942 km paved: 7,459 km unpaved: improved earth 13,538 km; unimproved earth 48,945 km. (Source: KPMG Caipo y Asociados, Latin America, Country Profile: Peru. <http://www.latinameric.kpmg.com/peru.htm>).
- ²⁷ Bernal Diaz. A conquistador who embarked upon the conquest of Peru with Pizarro, in his journal.
- ²⁸ Reconquista is a Spanish term meaning the reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Muslims. This process ostensibly began following the Muslim invasion (711-719) and lasted off and on 1492. The Reconquista was not seriously undertaken until 1481.
- ²⁹ Spain's wars with France began in 1495 and did not end until 1559. France had twice the population of Spain as well as more wealth and natural resources. To hold her own Spain needed to hire mercenaries who were very expensive. During this time period money meant gold and silver. It is estimated that there were about 90 metric tons in Europe in the 16th century. If this were cast into a single ingot it would be about 6 feet square. Silver was rather more plentiful: 3200 metric tons. By 1560 approximately 101 metric tons of gold and 6,872 metric tons of silver were shipped from the New World to Spain. (Source: The Conquistadores, Wise, Terrence. Osprey Publishing, London, 1982. 5,6).
- ³⁰ The legend of El Dorado, or the "Golden Man" pervaded much of Spanish thought at this time. According to the legend, El Dorado was so rich that he covered his body entirely in gold.
- ³¹ Cortez when invading Mexico had 400 men, 15 horses, 10 heavy cannon and 4 lighter pieces and faced an Aztec army of some 40,000 or more. Pizarro took 106 foot soldiers and 62 cavalry.
- ³² His travels began in 1525 when he sailed from Panama to explore "Piru." En-route his ships encountered storms and the Spanish found themselves ashore at the "Port of Famine" where his men suffered from thirst and hunger. Pizarro and his company made their painful way back to Panama to refit and to get reinforcements. After exploring the coast of Ecuador in 1526, Pizarro encountered some Indians who presented him with gold. They also hailed him as the "Viracocha Inca" whose return was foretold by prophecy. Having tasted gold once, Pizarro wanted more. He returned to Spain claiming that he had explored Peru, and sought permission, and more importantly, funding to continue his explorations. Charles V of Spain named Pizarro Viceroy and provided him sufficient funds to continue his travels throughout Peru.

- ³³ Atahualpa had recently ascended the throne following a civil war defeating his brother. The Spaniards would later accuse Atahualpa of usurping the Inca throne.
- ³⁴ Prescott, William H. *History of the Conquest of Mexico & History of the Conquest of Peru*. Modern Library, New York, 1847: 948.
- ³⁵ Prescott estimates the take at 1,326,539 pesos de oro, or \$15082748.43 (1950's valuation), reputedly the highest ransom ever collected. It is uncertain that the Incas would have been able to produce the entire amount agreed upon as ransom. Many of the Incas were hiding their golden idols and plate to keep it out of the hands of the Spanish. A great deal of the gold already delivered to Cajamarca was in plate form which, although valuable, added little to height of the pile. Prescott: 966; Wise: 5.
- ³⁶ Twelve charges preferred against Atahualpa. The most important of these charges was That he had usurped the crown and assassinated his brother. Atahualpa was also accused of squandering public revenues spending them on his followers. The Inca was found guilty of idolatry, and adulterous practice, indulging openly in a polygamous marriage; and finally that he had attempted to cause a revolution against the Spaniards. Prescott: 973.
- ³⁷ The Cuban inspired Movimiento Revolucionaria Tupac Amaru (MRTA) has taken Tupac Amaru as a symbol of native Peruvian resistance.
- ³⁸ Mestizos are descendants of Spanish and Indian parents. At one time there were approximately 15 different categories for individuals based on their lineage. The Peninsulare (someone who had been born in Spain and migrated to the New World) reigned supreme, while the Indian and the African alternated for last place (depending on the particular colony involved). Somewhere occupying the middle strata of Spanish colonial society were the mestizos and crilloios.
- ³⁹ Fishel, John T. "Coca, Cocaine, Sicarios, and Senderistas." *Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict*. Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois: Chicago, 1995, 185.
- ⁴⁰ Prescott, William H. *History of the Conquest of Mexico & History of the Conquest of Peru*. Modern Press: New York: 803.
- ⁴¹ JOINT PUB 3-07.4, JOINT COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994. I-1.
- ⁴² Stein, William W. *Hualcan: Life in the Highlands of Peru*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1961. 59.
- ⁴³ Fishel, John T. "Coca, Cocaine, Sicarios, and Senderistas." *Global Dimensions of High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict*. Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois: Chicago, 1995, 185.
- ⁴⁴ Stein, William W. *Hualcan: Life in the Highlands of Peru*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1961. 59.
- ⁴⁵ The People's Chronology is licensed from Henry Holt and Company, Inc. Copyright © 1994 by James Trager. All rights reserved.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Belaunde Terry, Fernando, 1912-, president of Peru (1963 - 68, 1980 - 85). An architect, he effected social, educational, and land reforms in his first term as president. In 1968 he was deposed by an army coup and went into exile. Restored to the presidency in 1980, he attempted to combat inflation by denationalizing industries and encouraging foreign investment in the petroleum industry. (Source: Microsoft Bookshelf 95).
- ⁴⁸ Simpson, John. *In the Forests of the Night: Encounters in Peru With Terrorism, Drug-Running and Military Oppression*. Random House: New York, 1993. Pp. 130-131
- ⁴⁹ Of the three major coca producing nations in South America, Peru cultivates some 54%(115,300 hectares) of the coca crop, while Colombia harvests 24%

- (50,900 hectares), and Bolivia accounts for 22% 48,600 hectares).
(Source: USSOUTHCOM Counterdrug Overview. December 1996).
- ⁵⁰ Van Cott, Donna Lee, *Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American Security*. National Defense University, Washington DC, 1996: 20.
- ⁵¹ The estimated world distribution is: US 300 MT; Europe/Africa 120 MT; Asia 61 metric tons (MT); Latin America 50 MT, 1995 seizures were about 249 MT. (Source: USSOUTHCOM Counterdrug Overview. December 1996).
- ⁵² McCormick, Gordon H. *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, 1994. 5.
- ⁵³ "Narcoterrorists Build Bastions in Amazon Region", Paris AFP, 1634 GMT (1 June 1984, as translated in FBIS-LAM-84-157, p.12.
- ⁵⁴ The Sendero Luminoso cadres have a particularly puritanical bent and deal harshly with anyone suspected of prostitution, or of having too much wealth. In fact they have killed peasants for owning as little as a bicycle (Rosenberg: 197.)
- ⁵⁵ Tupac Amaru was the last Inca chieftain to conduct rebellion against the Spaniards. He was captured and executed in 1537.
- ⁵⁶ Central Committee of the MRTA, *El Partido*. P.9.
- ⁵⁷ Rural actions accounted for some 38% of the MRTAs total from 1984 to 1990. A majority of the MRTAs actions are carried out in 11 of Peru's 186 provinces.
- ⁵⁸ Most recently the December 1996 seizure of the Japanese embassy in Lima by MRTA cadres. However the MRTA have conducted a jailbreak that the Peruvian press has dubbed the "Great Escape"
- ⁵⁹ McCormick, Gordon H. *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement*. National Defense Research Institute: Santa Monica. 30.
- ⁶⁰ McCormick, Gordon H. *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement*. National Defense Research Institute: Santa Monica.;
- ⁶¹ Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice, Before the: Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere House International Relations Committee Regarding: Certification of Drug Producing & Transit Countries in Latin America. March 7, 1996. Drug Enforcement Administration, Congressional Testimony, <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/cnrgtest/ct960912.htm>
- ⁶² Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office: 1994. I-2.
- ⁶³ The Bush administration National Priorities outlined in the 1992 NDCS were:
1. Deterring new and casual users. 2. Freeing current users. 3. Focus on the organization. 4. Focus on the supply networks. 5. Focus on the street dealer.
- ⁶⁴ The goals of the Clinton Administration are: Goal 1: Motivate America's youth to reject illegal drugs and substance abuse. Goal 2: Increase the safety of America's citizens by substantially Goal 3. 3 educing drug-related crime and violence.Goal 3: Reduce health, welfare, and crime costs resulting from illegal drug use. Goal 3: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat. Goal 4: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply. (Source: *ibid.*)
- ⁶⁵ USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No. 7, July 1996
(<http://www.usia.gov/journals/itgic/0796/ijge/ejinfo1.htm>)
- ⁶⁶ The official estimate is that 1/3 of the cocaine bound for the United States is seized before it "hits the streets." (Source: USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No. 7, July 1996
(<http://www.usia.gov/journals/itgic/0796/ijge/ejinfo1.htm>).
- ⁶⁷ Some 1600 flights per year.
- ⁶⁸ Mendel William, W., Munger Murl D. *Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat* (External Draft, 10 February 1997). Strategic Studies Institute & Foreign Military Studies Office: Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 14.

- ⁶⁹ Drug smugglers have even built several low silhouette boats that have most of the hull under the waterline two of these have been seized by the US Coast Guard.
- ⁷⁰ Mendel William, W., Munger Murl D. Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (External Draft, 10 February 1997). Strategic Studies Institute & Foreign Military Studies Office: Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 3. Joint Pub 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994: III-3.
- ⁷¹ Joint Pub 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994: III-5.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ Joint Pub 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994: III-18.
- ⁷⁵ Joint Pub 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994: III-3.
- ⁷⁶ USSOUTHCOM is scheduled to move from Panama to Miami Florida during 1997.
- ⁷⁷ Mendel William, W., Munger Murl D. Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (External Draft, 10 February 1997). Strategic Studies Institute & Foreign Military Studies Office: Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 13.
- ⁷⁸ Mendel William, W., Munger Murl D. Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (External Draft, 10 February 1997). Strategic Studies Institute & Foreign Military Studies Office: Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 16.
- ⁷⁹ Anderas, Peter R., Sharpe, Kenneth E. Cocaine Politics in the Andes. Current History (February 1992). 77.
- ⁸⁰ E-3 Sentry(AWACS)-(USAF). This is an airborne early warning, and command and control aircraft based on the Boeing 707 airframe. It is used for air and maritime radar surveillance, detection, and tracking of suspected smuggler aircraft and vessels. The E-3 can data link radar information to a ground site, and can also provide close control to US military interceptor aircraft. It is equipped with a surveillance radar with detection ranges of over 200 nautical miles and has IFF/SIF interrogation capability. Communications include HF, VHF, VHF-FM, UHF, and SATCOM. It has a maximum speed of 460 nautical miles per hour and an endurance of over 9 hours, which can be extended through aerial refueling. (Source: Joint Pub 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994: F-1).
- ⁸¹ Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR)-(USN). This is a Navy sponsored over-the-horizon back-scatter radar system capable of providing wide area detection and surveillance of air targets up to 2000 nautical miles from the site with real-time reporting of targets of interest appropriate agencies. There is currently one ROTHR site operating in Chesapeake, VA, with a second site in Texas A third site is currently planned for installation in Puerto Rico with operations beginning in FY 97. (Source: Joint Pub 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office: 1994. F-8).
- ⁸² Mendel William, W., Munger Murl D. Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (External Draft, 10 February 1997). Strategic Studies Institute & Foreign Military Studies Office: Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 13.
- ⁸³ Kolb, Richard. "Tracking the Traffickers, U.S. SOUTHCOM Counters Cocaine at the Source," VFW Magazine, March 1997, 12-17; Black, Chris. "Traffickers Adapt to US Antidrug Efforts in Peru." Boston Globe. 10 July 1996, 6.
- ⁸⁴ Harmon, Robert; Malave, Ramon; Miller, Charles; Nadolski. "Counterdrug Assistance: The Number One Priority". Military Review, October 1993. 28.;
- ⁸⁵ Source: Special Operations Command South Command Briefing. December 1996.
- ⁸⁶ Riverine training is the primary form of MTT that has takes place in Peru. While there are probably army and aviation MTTs that have occurred in Peru

- over the past three years that information is not available. (Source: Special Operations Command South Command Briefing. December 1996.
- ⁸⁷ Source: Special Operations Command South Command Briefing. December 1996.
- ⁸⁸ There is no data available that accounts for the difference between the 1995 CD deployments and the increase to 14 deployments in both 1996 1997.
- ⁸⁹ Mendel William, W., Munger Murl D. Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat. Strategic Studies Institute & Foreign Military Studies Office: Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. 13.
- ⁹⁰ Scrutton, Alister. "Cocaine Trade Threatens Peru, Experts Say." Dallas Morning News. 15 August 1996: 10A.
- ⁹¹ NCSR, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, p408.
- ⁹² ONDCP, President's Council on Counter-Narcotics, Department/Agency Reports: Implementing the 1996 National Drug Control Strategy. Washington DC. 21 May 1996. 43; This sentiment has been echoed by Simon Strong who maintains that most peasants would prefer to cultivate more legitimate crops, because of the roller coaster prices of coca, and the inherent dangers of dealing with traffickers. However this rosy sentiment stands in contrast to reports that the peasants in Peru have begun to grow poppies, probably to branch into the heroin industry.(Source: Portillo, Zordaida. "Harvest of Desperation." International Press Service, 31 January 1996).
- ⁹³ Heraclitus (c. 535-c. 475 BC), Greek philosopher. Quoted in: Hippocrates, On The Universe. (Source: The Columbia Dictionary of Quotations is licensed from Columbia University Press. Copyright © 1993 by Columbia University Press. All rights reserved).
- ⁹⁴ Strong, Simon. Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru. Random House: New York, 1992. 117.
- ⁹⁵ Kowalski, BJ. "Army Junkies?" World Press Review, Volume 43, Issue 8, August 1996, 23.
- ⁹⁶ Fry, Glenn, "Smuggler's Blues," THE ALLNIGHTER. MCA Records, Universal City: CA, 1984.
- ⁹⁷ An interview with Barry McCaffrey, director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), by Jim Fuller. USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No. 7, July 1996,

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